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requirements, such as security and performance. For example, a
highly secure system may pay a performance price compared to
an unsecure system, due to the extra security checks it must do.
System designers need to make choices between competing
design solutions in order to satisfactorily balance system
requirements. Tradeoffs between competing requirements often
come late in the development cycle, and changes can be
expensive if they are fundamental, such as architectural changes.
A better approach, enabled by OMG’s Model Driven Architecture
(MDA), is to start analyzing different non-functional
requirements from the early stages of the development process,
based on design models.

ABSTRACT
The focus of the paper is on the analysis of performance effects of
different security solutions modeled as aspects in UML. Aspect
oriented modeling (AOM) allows software designers to isolate
and separately address solutions for crosscutting concerns, which
are defined as distinct UML aspect models, then are composed
with the primary UML model of the system under development.
For performance analysis we use techniques developed previously
in the PUMA project, which take as input UML models annotated
with the standard UML Profile for Schedulability, Performance
and Time (SPT), and transform them first into Core Scenario
Model (CSM) and then into different performance models. The
contribution of this paper is in performing the composition of the
aspects with the primary model at the CSM level. The input is
represented by the primary model and a number of aspect models
in UML+SPT, which are processed as follows: a) converted
separately to CSM; b) composed into a single CSM model; c)
transformed into a Layered Queueing Networks (LQN) model and
d) analyzed. The proposed approach is illustrated with a case
study based on two standards, TPC-W and SSL.

An approach for the analysis of various non-functional properties
of a UML design model is currently emerging; similar steps are
followed, regardless of the non-functional property considered: a)
annotate the UML model with extra-information specific to the
non-functional property (by using special-purpose UML Profiles);
b) transform the annotated model in a specific analysis model
(such as first predicate logic, queuing networks, Petri nets, etc.);
c) analyze the model with existing tools; d) give feedback to
designers from the analysis results.

Categories and Subject Descriptors

The authors of the paper are involved in a larger research effort to
integrate methodologies and tools that support the analysis of
non-functional requirements, such as security and performance,
from the early system development phases, based on UML
models.

C.4 [Performance of Systems]: modeling techniques,
performance attributes. D.2.4 Software/Program Verification:
model checking

General Terms
Performance, Security, Design.

A UML-based approach for verifying whether a design meets
security properties is presented in [9]. A UML model annotated
with a specialized profile named UMLsec is converted into a firstorder logic model, which is input to a theorem prover, along with
a representation of an adversary. The prover determines if the
system model is secure.

Keywords
Software Performance Engineering, Aspect-Oriented Modeling,
Security, Model transformations, UML.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Risk-Driven Development (RDD) profile supports the
Aspect-Oriented Risk Driven Development (AORDD) framework
[7],[8]. The goal of the framework is to assist developers in
designing cost-effective systems with the desired level of security.
It is a model-based approach, driven by asset risk management.

Complex distributed dependable systems, such as web-based
applications that contain sensitive data and have many users, have
to meet different – and sometimes conflicting – non-functional
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy
otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists,
requires prior specific permission and/or a fee.
WOSP’07, February 5-8, 2007, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Copyright 2007 ACM 1-59593-297-6/07/0002…$5.00.

Aspect-oriented modeling (AOM) is used to specify and integrate
security risks and solution designs into system models [4],[17]. In
general, AOM allows software designers to isolate and separately
address solutions for any crosscutting concerns, which are defined
as separate UML aspect models, then are composed with (or
“weaved in”) the primary UML model of the system. Such
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is designed to work with a tool chain like the PUMA tool
architecture shown in Figure 1.

concerns range from high-level, user-visible requirements (such
as reliability, security, new functional features) to low-level
implementation issues (such as synchronization and buffering).
There are many notable research efforts in the area of aspect
composition, both for structure and behaviour. Different UML
means for representing behaviour have been used for aspect
composition; for instance, interaction diagrams are used in
[4],[20], statecharts in [6], [10], and activity diagrams in [2], [18].

Any U M L
or other
design too l

The first attempt to analyze the overall performance effects of
weaving an aspect model (which represents a security
mechanism) is found in [18]. The aspect model is composed with
the primary model at the UML level; the composed model is then
transformed into a LQN model according to the PUMA approach
[22]. Bringing performance concerns to aspect-oriented modeling
is adding new issues that have to be taken care of during aspect
composition, such as paying special attention to resource usage
and taking care of the composition of SPT performance
annotations. For instance, it is necessary to add concurrency and
deployment to the list of model views affected by aspect weaving,
as these are important for performance analysis (whereas in nonperformance related aspect composition, these views are usually
ignored).

D esign
m o de l w ith
perfo rm a nce
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this perform a nce
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Scena rio
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space
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Figure 1. Tool interactions and information flows in the
PUMA architecture [22].

2.1 The PUMA methodology
A wide variety of approaches can be applied to performance
modeling of software [1]. PUMA (Performance by Unified Model
Analysis) [22] unifies the creation of models by an intermediate
performance metamodel called Core Scenario Model (CSM) [14].
As shown in Figure 1, CSM provides a single target for
transforming from a design model created by any UML tool, and
from different UML views of system behaviour (e.g. interaction
diagrams, activity diagrams), and a single source for creating
different kinds of performance models (e.g. queueing models,
Petri net models).

The present paper approaches the problem from [18] in a different
way. It takes as input a primary model and one or more security
aspect models in UML+SPT, and processes them as follows: i)
separately transforms the primary and the aspect models to CSM;
ii) composes them at the CSM level; iii) transforms the CSM
composed model into LQN, and iv) analyzes the LQN model. The
main advantages of this approach are: a) the aspect composition
algorithm is simpler, as the CSM metamodel is much simpler than
the UML metamodel and processing performance annotations is
an intrinsic part of CSM; b) a “single” composition algorithm
must be devised instead of several algorithms for all the possible
kinds of UML behavioral diagrams; and c) it is possible to mix
different behavioural descriptions (e.g., compose aspects defined
originally as activity diagrams with a primary model using
sequence diagrams, and vice-versa). An obvious disadvantage of
the proposed approach is that aspect composition at the CSM
level is not able to solve non-performance related problems that
are dealt with at the UML level (such as consistency and
correctness checks at model level, model transformations, etc.)

CSM defines operations (called Steps) with precedence
relationships and resource requirements and demands. Precedence
patterns include sequence, loop, fork/join, branch/merge, with no
requirement that a forked or branched path should rejoin into a
single flow. Resources include processors, other devices, software
components, processes and logical resources of all kinds, and
demands describe how many requests are made by a step, or how
much CPU processing is demanded. Each scenario has a workload
which defines the arrivals of requests to execute the scenario.
Examples are given in Section 4 below.
The process of model derivation from a CSM is described in [22]
for queueing networks, layered queueing networks (which are
used in this paper), and stochastic Petri net models. In this paper
we show that system transformations for the insertion of security
aspects into the primary model of a system can also be executed
at the CSM level, to explore alternative approaches.

The paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly describes the
PUMA approach for transforming UML+SPT models into
performance models; section 3 discusses aspect-oriented
modeling of security mechanisms and describes the case study
system based on TPC-W and SSL; section 4 introduces our new
approach of composing aspects at the CSM level; section 5
presents the LQN model and some performance results and
section 6 gives the conclusions and future work.

3. UML ASPECT-ORIENTED MODELING
OF SECURITY MECHANISMS
Aspect-Oriented Modeling (AOM) techniques allow software
designers to separately conceptualize, describe and communicate
solutions for crosscutting concerns (such as security, reliability,
new functional features, etc.) An aspect-oriented architecture
model produced by AOM consists of a base architecture model
called the primary model, which reflects core design decisions,
and a set of aspect models, each reflecting a concern that
crosscuts the primary model [4]. In order to build the complete
solution for a system, different aspect models are composed with
the primary model. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the UML primary

2. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF UML
MODELS
To support early performance analysis of software specifications,
the UML has been extended by the standard SPT Profile ([12],
currently being revised [13]), which defines annotations for
performance parameters, resource usage, and workloads. SPT
focuses on specified scenarios based on important use cases and
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customer has to fill out a customer registration page; for returning
customers, the personal information is retrieved from the database
and filled in automatically. Before ordering, the user may update
the shopping cart content. When deciding to buy, the user enters
the credit card information and submits the order. The system will
obtain credit card authorization from a Payment Gateway
Emulator, PGE, and present the user with an order confirmation
page. At a later date the user can view the status of the last order.
Two additional web pages are provided for the system
administrator.

model for the TPC-W example used in this paper, while Figure 5
shows the SSL aspect model.

3.1 Primary model
The case study for this paper is based on TPC-W, a transactional
web benchmark of the Transaction Processing Performance
Council [21], which models the workload of an on-line bookstore.
The primary model represents the basic functionality without any
security mechanisms. SSL secure communication is later added to
the primary model through aspect composition.

The navigation options provided on every page, lead to an access
distribution referred to as the “Web Interaction Mix”. Thus 80%
of the web page accesses are to the Home, New Products, Best
Sellers and Search pages while the remaining 20% of the accesses
are to the Shopping Cart, Order, Buy and Admin web pages. Of
the 20% ordering web pages, 5% of the accesses are to secure
web pages requiring SSL encryption.

The components of TPC-W are logically divided into three tiers:
a) set of emulated web browsers (EB), b) web tier including Web
Servers, Image Servers and Web Caches and c) persistent storage.
TPC-W simulates customers browsing and buying products from
a website.
The TPC-W specification describes in detail 14 different web
pages that correspond to typical operations performed by a
customer of an e-commerce website. The first page to be visited
by a user is the “Home” page; it includes the company logo,
promotional items and navigation options to the top best selling
books, a list of new books, search pages, shopping cart, and order
status pages. At every page, the user is offered a selection of
pages that can be visited next; the user will make a random
choice. The user may browse pages containing product
information, perform searches with different keys and put items in
the cart, or may decide to order books by entering secure order
pages, protected by SSL. In order to make an order, a new

As the purpose of this paper is to illustrate how security aspects
can be composed with the primary model of a system at CSM
level, we have not considered the entire functionality of TPC-W
for the UML primary model. We have selected instead only two
scenarios that are accessing secure pages: one is a light-weight
scenario that returns the customer registration page (shown in
Figure3) and the other a heavy-weight scenario that allows the
user to buy a product (shown in Figure4).
The primary UML model contains a structural and a behavioural
view necessary for performance evaluation [15].

Figure 2. UML deployment diagram for TPC-W

sd: GetCustRegPage
<<PAresource>>

:EB

<<PAresource>>

:WebServer

<<PAresource>>

:ImageServer

getCustRegPage( )

MsgSize: 0.5KB

getCustRegImgs

CPU: 0.5ms

customerRegPage

MsgSize: 2KB

CPU: 1ms

Figure 3. TPC-W UML primary model: scenario GetCustRegPage
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sd: GetBuyConfirmPage
<<PAresource>>

<<PAresource>>

:EB

<<PAresource>>

<<PAresource>>

:WebServer

:Database

:ImageServer

getBuyConfirmPage (PayInfo, ShippingInfo )
getShoppingCart( )
MsgSize: 2.9KB

CPU: 1ms
setShippingAddr( )

opt

MsgSize: 1KB

matchAddrRecord ( )

P=0.05

CPU: 2ms
CPU: 0.5ms
MsgSize: 0.5KB

opt

MsgSize: 1KB

insertAddrRecord ( )

P=0.5

CPU: 1ms
MsgSize: 0KB

ref

Checkout

getBuyConfirmImgs

CPU: 0.5ms
buyConfirmPage

MsgSize: 8.2KB

sd: Checkout
<<PAresource>>

<<PAresource>>

:Database

:WebServer

CPU: 1ms

checkout ( )
createOrder( )

CPU: 5ms

MsgSize: 1KB

insertOrderRecord ( )

CPU: 1ms
loop [I=1,$N]

MsgSize: 0.5KB
insertOrderLineRecord ( )

CPU: 1ms
updateItemStock ( )

CPU: 1ms

getAuthorization( )

CPU: 1ms
CPU: 5ms

MsgSize: 0.5KB

buildAuthorizationRequest( )
sendRequstToPGE( )
authorization( )

ExternalOp: 30ms

extractAuthID ( )

MsgSize: 1KB

CPU: 5ms
createCreditCardRecord ( )

CPU: 1ms
clearShoppingCart ( )

CPU: 0.5ms

Figure 4. TPC-W UML primary model: scenario GetBuyConfirmPage
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• repetition count PArep for loop interaction operands
stereotyped as <<PAstep>>
• PArate in processor operations per millisecond for host
devices (applicable to nodes stereotyped as <<PAhost>>)
• PAcapacity for device multiplicity (applicable to nodes
stereotyped as <<PAresource>>)
• The operation performed by the PGE external system is
represented as an SPT “external operation” (a tagged value
of the stereotype PAstep that indicates the name of the
external operation and the number of visits [12]). It will be
represented in the performance model as a new task.
Please note that we have not given in Figures 3 and 4 the full SPT
syntax for performance annotations, in order to limit the clutter.
However, the complete stereotypes and corresponding tagged
values were defined with the IBM Rational Software Architect
(RSA) tool used to generate automatically the CSM models
shown in the next section. An additional performance annotation
for message size in kilobytes $MSG_SIZE is also shown in
Figures 3 and 4. (It is used later in Table 2 for computing concrete
parameter values, such as the number of message fragments).

-

Deployment of high-level software components to hardware
devices (Figure 2)
One or more key performance scenarios annotated with
performance information according SPT [12], modeled in
this case as interaction diagrams (Figures 3 and 4).
The deployment diagram shows the software components, their
corresponding artifacts and the deployment of artifacts on
processing nodes. The DBProc node is stereotyped with both
PAhost and PAresource since it has a multiplicity of 5. The
PAhost stereotype identifies the node as a host, while the
PAresource stereotype is needed to specify the multiplicity. If the
multiplicity is not specified, it’s always assumed to be 1.
The interaction GetCustRegPage, shown in Figure3, returns
the registration web page to EB. This scenario is interesting
because it starts with a non-secure message between EB and
WebServer, but ends with a secure reply. The User will use the
returned page to register as a known or new customer in another
interaction (not shown here). The following operations are
performed:
-

EB issues a request for the customer registration page;
WebServer gets the necessary images (company logo,
button images, etc) from ImageServer;
WebServer constructs the html customer registration page
and returns it to EB.

3.2 Generic Aspect model
A generic aspect model describes the solution proposed by the
aspect in a general way, not related to the specific primary model
in which will be eventually inserted. According to [4], a generic
aspect model can be instantiated multiple times to produce
multiple context-specific aspect models based on different binding
rules.

The scenario GetBuyConfirmPage is described in two
interaction diagrams shown in Figure 4. The top interaction
transfers the shopping cart content into a newly created order for
the registered customer and executes a full payment authorization,
then returns a web page containing the details of the newly
created order to the EB. The following operations are performed:
-

-

The generic aspect model used in this paper describes the general
structure and behaviour of the SSL protocol, without any
reference to the system to which SSL will be applied. SSL is the
most common authentication protocol used for web-based secure
transactions [11]. It handles mutual or one-way authentication and
preserves the integrity and confidentiality of data exchange
between clients and servers. SSL has two phases: a handshake
phase and a data transfer phase. Each phase represents a different
functionality that should be inserted in the primary model at
different join points. Therefore, each phase is to be modeled as a
separate aspect model. Due to space limitations, we will describe
in this paper only the data transfer aspect model.

EB issues a request to WebServer for “buy confirm page”;
WebServer gets the corresponding shopping cart object;
With 5% probability, a shipping address is passed from EB.

WebServer tries to match the shipping address in
the corresponding table in the database

If no address record is found, insert a new address
record
Invokes the Checkout sub-scenario (as a ref fragment)
WebServer gets necessary images from ImageServer
WebServer constructs the html code for the buy confirm
page and returns it to EB.

The handshake phase allows the server and client to authenticate
each other and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and
cryptographic keys to be used during the data transfer phase. The
encryption mechanisms are different during the two phases:
public key encryption is used for the handshake, and symmetric
encryption for data transfer. Symmetric encryption is much faster
than public key encryption [11].

The Checkout scenario is represented by the second interaction
diagram from Figure 4. It creates a new order in database, with all
the items in the cart turned into order lines. Then an authorization
is obtained from the Payment Gateway Emulator (PGE) that is an
external system. Finally the credit card is registered in database
and the cart is cleared.

The SSL data transfer is modeled as a generic aspect in Figure 5,
which shows a deployment diagram describing constraints on the
structure, as well as an interaction diagram describing the
behaviour. In this case, the structural constraint is that the SSL
proxies must be located on the same node as the processes they
are associated with. All the nodes are generic; they will be bound
to concrete nodes in the process of instantiating the contextspecific aspects, as described in section 4.2. The interaction
diagram in Figure 5.b involves four generic roles: |sender (the
data source), |senderSSL (data source SSL proxy),
|receiver (data target) and |receiverSSL (data target SSL

The SPT Profile performance annotations used in this primary
model are:
• CPU host demand in milliseconds for operations (applicable
to execution occurrences and message stereotyped as
<<PAstep>>)
• probability PAprob for alt and opt interaction operands
stereotyped as <<PAstep>>
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Figure 5. Generic Aspect UML model for SSL Data Transfer: deployment and interaction diagrams
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mentioned, a generic aspect model can be instantiated multiple
times to produce multiple context-specific aspect models based on
different binding rules. Because SPT annotations are necessary
for performance analysis, the binding rules have two parts: one
for binding generic roles to components/nodes from the primary
model, and the other for giving concrete values to the
performance parameters, as described in section 4.2.

proxy). We use the convention that generic role names start with a
‘|’, similar to [4]. These roles are to be bound to application
components when the generic aspect is instantiated to a specific
context. A message from |sender is first broken into fragments
by |senderSSL. The number of fragments depends on the
length of the data to be transferred. For each fragment, the source
counter is incremented; this is the unique counter for the data
source. Both the target and source counters are appended to the
fragment and a digest is created across this string, using a secret
digest string. The digest is appended onto the fragment and then
encrypted using the symmetric key exchanged during the
handshake phase (resulting in a payload). A header is pre-pended
to this information, which contains the type of the message, the
length of the fragment and digest, and the SSL version number
used by the data source. This entire entity is the record that is sent
to the target; |receiverSSL increments the source counter,
extracts the header, decrypts the payload using the symmetric
key, extracts the fragment and digest, and validates the digest
using the secret digest string. If either the decryption or the digest
validation fails, the receiving target sends an alert to the data
source that indicates the failure type. Depending on the overall
application protocol (which is independent of the SSL protocol),
the data source may attempt to re-send the record, or terminate.

The composition of the aspect models with a primary model can
be performed at different levels: UML or CSM. There are many
papers in the literature focused on the composition at the UML
level. For instance, in [4][17], the generic aspect models are
defined by using the concept of UML templates. The contextspecific models are obtained from generic models by binding the
parameter templates to values from the primary model context.
The advantage of composing at the UML level is that the resulting
model is also in UML; therefore, it may be further visualized,
developed, transformed or analyzed with tools that operate
directly on UML models. A disadvantage is that the UML
metamodel is very complex; this has a direct impact on any
composition algorithms.
In this paper we propose for the first time to perform the aspect
composition at the CSM level. One advantage is that CSM was
defined to be a unique target for transformation from many UML
versions and diagrams, and a source to many performance
models. For instance, we are able to compose aspects with
primary models even if they are originally defined in different
UML behaviour diagrams (i.e., any mix of activity, sequence,
communication, and interaction overview diagrams can be
handled at the CSM level). Another advantage is that the CSM
metamodel is much simpler than the UML metamodel, and
therefore the composition algorithms are easier to design and
implement. An obvious disadvantage is that CSM, whose purpose
is to model scenarios, is much more restricted in scope and usage
than UML.

It is important to mention that the performance annotations in
generic aspects use variable placeholders instead of concrete
values for the tagged values PAdemand, PAprob, etc. These
variables will be assigned concrete values only after the
instantiation of the generic aspect to specific contexts (as
described in section 4.2).
The description of the SSL data transfer aspect model raises a
general issue: what level of detail is appropriate for the UML
model when trying to integrate the analysis of multiple nonfunctional properties - in this case, security and performance. The
interaction diagram from Figure 5.b gives a detailed functional
description that is necessary for the logical verification of the
security mechanisms by using a first-order logic model, as in [9].
However, for performance analysis a coarser granularity level
would be more appropriate. For instance, many of the small
sequential steps could be aggregated into larger steps, which
would need fewer performance annotations.

4. CSM ASPECT COMPOSITION
4.1 CSM Generic Aspect Model
In the PUMA toolset, CSM models are automatically generated
from UML+SPT models created with the IBM Rational Software
Architect (RSA) either from sequence or from activity diagrams
[22]. For this work, we used CSM models obtained with the
CSMGenerator, an Eclipse-based RSA plug-in that traverses
UML 2.0 Sequence Diagrams with performance annotations and
generates a CSM Scenario for every diagram.

On one hand, it would be preferable to have a different UML
view of the system under development for each kind of analysis
we intend to perform. However, the problem is that these different
views need to be maintained separately as the system evolves, so
there is a danger that they could get out of synch. Hence, there is
a strong argument for keeping a single UML model as the input
for different analysis techniques and tools. The implication is that
automatic model transformations will be required to raise the
level of abstraction to an appropriate level for different analysis
techniques. For instance, in the case of performance analysis, the
aggregation of different steps could be done automatically, under
the user’s guidance. The user needs to be involved if he/she
would have to enter performance annotations only for the coarsergranularity steps obtained by aggregation.

UML scenarios with a PAworkload generate top-level CSM
Scenarios, while UML scenarios without a workload annotation
generate CSM sub-scenarios. Lifelines in the interaction diagram
generate CSM Components which can have host associations with
CSM ProcessingResources that are specified as nodes in UML
deployment diagram.
Figure 6 shows the CSM top-level scenario for the TPC-W
GetBuyConfirmPage primary model, as well as the
Checkout sub-scenario, shown in Figure 4. The top-level
scenario shows the CSM Steps corresponding to the execution
occurrences stereotyped as <<PAstep>> in the interaction
diagram as well as explicit ResourceAcquire and ResourceRelease
elements for the resources corresponding to the lifelines.

3.3 Aspect Composition
Before composing the aspect with the primary model, we need to
instantiate the generic aspect model for a given application context by binding the roles to application-specific values. As already
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Figure 6. CSM GetBuyConfirmPage primary model
A ResourceAcquire is generated whenever a lifeline first receives
a synchronous or asynchronous call message or whenever
execution first stars. A ResourceRelease is generated whenever a
lifeline sends an asynchronous call message or whenever
execution finishes.
Opt and loop combined fragments are shown as CSM complex
steps with the loop interaction operands as refinements for those
complex steps. The interaction operand details are shown as CSM
sub-scenarios. For the GetBuyConfirm top-level scenario, the
opt combined fragment for setting the shipping address is shown
as the OPT_SetShippingAddr complex step with a corresponding
refinement as the OPT_SetShippingAddress sub-scenario (not
shown). Similarly in the Checkout scenario, the loop
combined fragment that inserts the order details is shown as the
LOOP_InsertOrder complex step and its corresponding subscenario (not shown).
Figure 7 shows the complete CSM scenario for the generic
SSLtransfer aspect introduced in Figure 5. For the SSLtransfer
example, the loop step and the corresponding sub-scenario are
both called LOOP_Fragments. The alt combined fragments are
shown as matched Branch and Merge constructs with complex
steps for every alternate interaction operand. The details of the
interaction operands are shown as separate sub-scenarios for
every operand. In Figure 7 the alternatives are: ALT_DecryptOK,
ALT_DecryptFail, ALT_DigestOK, and ALT_DigestFail.
Par combined fragments are treated similarly to alt combined
fragments. They generate matched CSM Fork and Join constructs
with complex steps for every parallel interaction operand.
Figure 7. Generic Aspect CSM model: SSLTransfer
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The performance values are the same for both the SSLcall and
SSLreply context-specific aspects because the two aspects are
symmetrical in this example. This is not always the case, and it
may be possible to have different context-specific aspects based
on the same generic aspect, which have different performance
values (e.g., different service demands for encryption and
decryption due to using different encryption algorithms).

The details of the interaction operands are then shown as subscenario refinements for the complex steps. The lifelines from the
sequence diagram correspond to generic CSM Components that
retain the role names. The generic components either have no host
associations if the roles have no deployment constraints, or have
host associations to CSM ProcessingResources that correspond to
nodes in any constraining UML deployment diagrams.

4.2 CSM Context-Specific Aspect Model

Table 2. Performance values for the top-level scenario in both
SSLcall and SSLreply context-specific aspect models

Generic aspect models are transformed into context-specific
aspect models by binding the resource roles to actual resources
and then assigning context-specific performance values to step
processing
demands,
branching
probabilities,
optional
probabilities, and loop repetition counts.

Step

The first step in transforming the generic aspect model into a
context-specific aspect model involves binding the generic
resource roles GR to context-specific resources SR. These contextspecific resources can be either existing resources PR from the
primary model, or new resources required by the aspect.

SSLreply

eb

webserver

|senderSSL

ebSendSSL (new)

webSendSSL (new)

|receiverSSL

webRcvSSL (new)

ebRcvSSL (new)

|receiver

webserver

eb

|senderProc

ClientProc

ServerProc

|receiverProc

ServerProc

ClientProc

msgComplete

0.1

sslMessage

0.1
Repetition Count
ceiling( $MSG_SIZE / 512 )

The CSM composed model is generated by weaving the contextspecific aspect models into the primary model. The weaving
involves identifying the appropriate join points in the primary
model behaviour and inserting the context-specific aspects at
those join points. As part of the weaving, an aspect’s resource
context must also be reconciled with the primary model resource
context at the join point. Finally, the woven aspects are inspected
for any remaining performance annotations that can be further
resolved.

Context-Specific Aspect

|sender

0.1

4.3 CSM Composed Model

Table 1. Context-specific aspect resource bindings

SSLcall

message

It is worth mentioning that the communication between the
WebServer and PGE taking place in the Checkout subscenario must be secure, as well. This would require the
instantiation of the SSL generic aspects to another context.
However, in this paper we have not done this instantiation and
composition for the sake of simplicity. We have assumed instead
that the latency of the external operation that accesses PGE
includes the overhead for SSL transfer.

In the TPC-W GetBuyConfirmPage example, the generic
SSLtransfer aspect is bound to two different context-specific
aspects; a context-specific SSLcall aspect for the EB calling the
WebServer, and a different context-specific SSLreply aspect for
the WebServer replying to the EB. The resource bindings for
the context-specific aspects are given in Table 1.

SSLtransfer

0.1

LOOP_Fragments

for all GRi:
if GRi has a corresponding PRj then
SRi = PRj
else
SRj = instantiate( GRi )

Generic Aspect

sslSend

Loop

The resource binding algorithm is as follows:

Service Demand

Figure 8 shows the CSM composed model for
GetBuyConfirmPage with SSL data transfer between EB and
WebServer. For this example, the join point for the SSLcall
aspect is the call step, while the join point for the SSLreply aspect
is the reply step. The weaving is done by replacing the join point
steps with complex steps – call and reply are replaced with
SSLcall and SSLreply – and using the context-specific aspects as
refinements for those complex steps.

The concrete annotations can be either values or expression (for
instance, the number of loop repetitions depends on the message
size, which depends on the join point into the primary model).

As part of the resource context reconciliation during weaving, the
SSLcall aspect loses the ResourceAcquire:eb element at the
beginning since EB is already acquired in the primary model
before SSLcall is invoked as well as the ResourceRelease:
webserver at the end, since it is already released in the primary
model after the aspect completes. Similarly, the SSLreply aspect
loses the first ResourceAcquire: webserver and the last Resource
Release: eb.

The values for the performance annotations used in the SSLcall
and SSLreply top-level scenarios are given in Table 2. The step
service demands have literal values, while the repetition count for
LOOP_Fragments is an expression indicating that the repetition
count is equal to the message size divided by the fragment size
(512 bytes) and rounded up to the nearest integer.
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combination with the existing sub-scenarios. More research is
necessary for developing algorithms for more complex
compositions cases such as these.

5. LQN PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The CSM primary and composed models are automatically
transformed into LQN models using the Csm2Lqn generator.
Csm2Lqn is an Eclipse-based tool that implements the Scenario to
Performance (S2P) algorithm described in [15].

5.1 LQN Primary and Composed Models
Figure 9 shows both the primary and the composed LQN models
for the TPC–W GetBuyConfirmPage example. For
simplicity, the entries and activities are hidden in these diagrams,
only tasks are shown in rectangular boxes. Tasks added as a result
of aspect composition are shown with a gray background. Call
relationships between tasks are denoted by arrows: a) solid arrows
represent synchronous calls; b) open arrows represent
asynchronous calls; c) solid arrows with dashed lines represent
forwarding calls. Ovals represent processors or hardware devices,
while lines between tasks and processors show deployment
relationship between software and hardware resources.
The primary model has a simple tiered client-server architecture
with eb making a synchronous call to webserver , which also acts
as a client to database, imageserver, and pge tasks. The composed
model introduces the ebSendSSL and webRcvSSL tasks between
eb and webserver, as well as the webSendSSL and ebRcvSSL tasks
from webserver back to eb. The simple synchronous interaction
between the eb and webserver tasks from the primary model is
replaced with a forwarding chain from eb to ebSendSSL,
webRcvSSL, webserver, webSendSSL, and finally ebRcvSSL. In
this model the eb task still blocks waiting for a reply, but the reply
is generated by the last task in the forwarding chain, ebRcvSSL.

5.2 Performance Results
The LQN performance model can be solved by either the
analytical solver LQNS or simulation solver LQSim [23]. LQNS
solves models mathematically, and is faster than LQSim. It works
very well for models with synchronous messages, but does not
handle as well models having a mix of synchronous with a lot of
asynchronous messages. LQSim takes a longer time to solve a
model, but gives more accurate results for complex models,
especially those containing a lot of forwarding/ asynchronous
interactions mixed with synchronous ones. In our case, the LQN
models for GetCustRegPage (which are smaller) were solved
with LQNS, and the models for GetBuyConfirmPage with
LQSim.

Figure 8. Composed CSM model
The aspect composition is straightforward in this case because the
SSL aspect was used to replace simple non-secure messages in the
primary model. This allowed us to substitute simple CSM steps
with one input and one output with composed steps with one input
and one output. In the general case, an aspect may require more
than a single input and/or output, which leads to a more complex
composition. Such an example is when an aspect model contains
alternative or parallel behaviours, where the respective branches
need to be “attached” to the primary model in different input or
output points.

The performance results obtained from the solvers include
throughputs and service times (including queuing delays) for
software resources, and utilization of both hardware and software
resources. The simulator also gives the confidence intervals for all
the results. The response times obtained from LQSim for the
GetBuyConfirmPage scenario are accurate within ± 2-3% at
95% confidence level. Figure 10 shows the response times for the
two scenarios studied in this paper, each giving the results for the
respective primary and composed model. The impact of the
SSLtransfer aspect on the scenario performance is noticeably
different
for
the
GetCustRegPage
and
the
GetBuyConfirmPage cases.

A more general composition approach involves defining aspect
join contexts instead of just join points. Instead of being simple
steps, join contexts are either CSM path fragments (i.e. sequences
of steps with single beginnings and single ends) or combinations
of CSM path fragments. Those path fragments are then used to
generate sub-scenarios and are replaced by complex steps using
those sub-scenarios as refinements. The aspects can be composed
into the model either as sub-scenario replacements or in
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refTask

the SSLtransfer aspect is of about 16% for 70 users and 36% for 80
users. The experiments show that the performance effect of the
SSLtransfer aspect on a light-weight scenario is more dramatic than
on a heavy-weight scenario. If the aspect increases the demand on a
resource that is already the bottleneck, then it increases the
bottleneck level and makes it appear earlier. If it increases the
demand on a resource that is not a bottleneck, then the bottleneck
may move from other resources to this one.

InfiniteProc
ClientProc

eb

ServerProc

webserver
database

imageserver

pge

DBProc

We are planning on carrying out a more comprehensive
performance analysis of the impact of SSL on TPC-W. For this, it is
necessary to model in UML all the TPC-W scenarios, compose the
primary model with both SSL aspects (handshake and data transfer)
and study the performance of the whole system under the workload
mix prescribed by the standard.

(a)

refTask

InfiniteProc

eb
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ebSendSSL

Gaining insight into the performance effects of different security
solutions can help the designers to make tradeoffs between security
and performance solutions, in order to satisfactorily balance
competing system requirements.
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Figure 9. LQN model for GetBuyConfirmPage
a) primary model; b) composed model

Composed model

(b) Response Time for Get Buy Confirm Page

The GetCustRegPage is a light-weight scenario, which simply
creates the content for a small webpage and returns it to the EB
client. Therefore, as shown in Figure 11.a, the primary model for
GetCustRegPage has a response time of less than 5ms and does not
saturate even with more than 500 simultaneous users. Additional
experiments show that the primary model can support 2000 users
executing light-weight scenarios without saturation. However the
composed model with SSL saturates with 350 users. The strong
performance impact is due to the fact that the extra resource
demands introduced by the aspect itself are much larger than the
demands of the original scenario. The bottleneck occurs in the
webSendSSL task, which has a utilization of 97%. This task is
introduced by the security aspect, and is responsible for encrypting
and sending messages from webserver to eb.
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Figure10. Performance results for: a) GetCustRegPage, and b)
GetBuyConfirmPage

The situation is different for GetBuyConfirmPage where the
primary model has a much heavier workload. As shown in Figure
11.b, both the primary and composed model start to saturate at a
rather low number of users (less than 20). An analysis of the
performance results shows that webserver is the bottleneck in both
models. The security aspect adds even more workload to the
bottleneck task and thus increases the response time, but does not
move the bottleneck elsewhere. The increase in response time due to

6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a novel approach for composing aspects with
the primary model at the Core Scenario Model (CSM) level. Aspect
oriented modeling (AOM) allows software designers to separately
address solutions for crosscutting concerns. We are applying AOM
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